This paper contributes to the current literature of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by studying the existence of waves and the determinants of M&A activity in the economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. From a sample of 2,490 M&As announcements reported by Thomson One for these countries, and applying the methodology proposed by Harford (2005) , evidence of M&A waves is found for the periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2010 as reported for other regions in various international studies. After controlling for economic and business environment variables, as well as for profitability and book-to-market variables at industry level, we find evidence in favor of the neoclassical theory as a main explanation for M&As, but not for the misvaluation effect. For this purpose, a Prais-Winsten data model with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) is used, and the results are confirmed through a negative binomial panel data estimation.
Introduction
Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). First, the neoclassical hypothesis explains M&As by fundamental reasons like the search for economies of scale, economies of vertical integration, combination of complementary resources, elimination of inefficiencies, industry consolidation, or profitable opportunities of growth (Brealey and Myers, 2003) . Second, an alternative hypothesis explains M&As by three types of arguments: taking advantage of distortions on firm valuation (Harford, 2005) , empire building (Jensen, 1986) or hubris on the part of the acquiring management (Roll, 1986) . These hypotheses have been studied in international markets, but not in Latin America.
In this study we put to test the two competing hypothesis by modeling both the macroeconomic and industry-specific determinants of M&As in Latin America. Our sample includes 2,391 announcements of M&As in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México and Perú, in the period 1995 to 2010, taken from Thompson One. Following most of the literature, we employ a Prais-Winsten panel data with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). Additionally we check the robustness of the results with a panel data negative binomial counting model, that allows for a more realistic modeling of the depending variable, number of M&As per year (Alba, Park & Wang, 2009; Hijzen, Görg & Manchin, 2008) .
The models consistently show evidence supporting the neoclassical model as the fundamental motivation for M&A activity in Latin America. We found that macro economic variables like interest rate, GDP growth and unemployment, appear significant and with the predicted sign. That's also true for business environment variables, like indexes of business freedom and tax freedom. Moreover, profitability measures at industry level also show a relationship with higher M&A deals. This holds on alternative specifications of the panel linear data, as well as in the alternative counting model.
We obtain further evidence of the neoclassical hypothesis driving M&A activity in Latin America. Consistent with the role of macro fundamental factors, we find that M&As in Latin America happen in waves. Using the methodology of Harford (2005) we find evidence of two M&A waves, the first between 1993-2002, and the second 2003-2010 . Those are concurrent with waves of M&As in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) , suggesting that worldwide macroeconomic and business environment changes are a main driver of M&A activity in the region. Taken together, the results portray economic factors to be determinant of M&As in Latin America, supporting the neoclassical hypothesis.
In contrast, industry-specific variables that proxy for misvaluation, like the level and dispersion of the Book-to-market ratio, show almost no significance in alternative specifications. This observation fails to provide support for the misvaluation argument included in the alternative hypothesis.
The fact that the neoclassical hypothesis explains M&As in Latin America, but the alternative hypothesis does not, can be explained by looking at the literature of Corporate Governance on these markets. The presence of some of the Corporate Governance issues identified in Latin America, like cross property, different voting rights, and high property concentration on listed firms, prevents that M&As can be used as a mechanism of market discipline on poorly run companies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) . In agreement with that, we note that none of the deals compiled in Thomson One for the six Latin American markets corresponds to a hostile takeover, and most of the deals were paid by cash.
The volume of announcements of mergers and acquisitions in Latin American economies has experienced a surge in the last 20 years. In the period between 1995 and 2010, M&A activity, measured as the number of announcements, grew by 67.4% while in Latin America grew by 198.8% . The search for new markets and the need to confront the challenges of a global market has motivated international companies, both from developed and LA countries, to expand in the region.
One advantage of focusing on Latin American M&As, is the variety of macroeconomic, business environment and industry specific variables, in a region with obvious similarities in legal origin, business culture, and governance issues across countries. Thus, Latin America offers an ideal setting to test for the drivers of M&As in panel data models. In addition, they present a structure of highly concentrated property (Benavides, 2005) . These conditions can generate potentially different results between the markets already studied and the Latin American market.
This study is organized in the following manner: In the second section, literature regarding waves of M&As and the determinants of this activity are examined. In the third section, the hypothesis for verifying this study is put forward. In the fourth and fifth sections, the data and methodology employed are described, respectively. Finally, in the sixth section proofs are presented and results discussed. The work is concluded in the last section.
Background
Companies use M&As as part of the strategic plans to expand their operations, enter new markets and increase their competiveness in a globalised market (Brealey and Myers, 2003) . Constituting a complex phenomenon in their motivation just as in their results, M&As have been studied from different perspectives. Some studies have principally focused on examining the economic and financial implications (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rossy and Volpin, 2004; Di Giovanni, 2005 ) managerial incentives of M&A deals (Roll, 1986; Jensen, 1986; Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997; Wang, Sakr, Ning and Davidson, 2010) . Additionally, studies of events have tested the reaction of both the acquirer and the target price upon the announcement of the deals (Eckbo, 1983; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989; Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah, 2005) . Alternatively, different authors have been interested by the long term behavior of a company`s performance after an operation of M&As (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004) Studies of the determinants of M&As suggest that specific characteristics of both companies as well as macro variables of the target country are relevant to the decision (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Di Giovanni, 2005; Kamaly, 2007; Piñeiro, Chaitanya and Tamazian, 2008) . Similarly, the levels of accounting regulation, protection of the investor's rights and protection of the foreign investment increase the probability of M&As in given country (Pablo, 2009; Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2010) . Besides, factors such as distance and culture partially explain the distribution of M&A activity across countries (Angwin, 2001; Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Hattari and Rajan, 2010) . Additionally, the literature identifies periods of high activity of M&As, in what is known as "waves of M&As" (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) .
Figure1.Waves of M&As for the United States between the period 1897-2002 (total number of deals).
Source: (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) In Figure 1 , the periodicity in the evolution of the activity of M&As between 1897 to 2001 in the United States can be observed. The periods that have been identified as waves of M&As stand out. In their study, Golbe and White (1993) model the time-series behavior of M&As in United States between 1895 and 1989 using sinusoidal curve to approximate the wave-like pattern.
In this respect, the literature has been able to relate each episode of waves of M&As with economic, political and/or regulation changes, as well as with periods of overvaluation in the stock market. The first wave known as "Horizontal Integration", occurred at the end of the 19th century, between the years 1897 and 1903 in the United States and coincided with a phase of economic expansion and the development of the Stock Exchange in New York (NYSE This wave is contemporaneous with the boom in financial markets, and has been associated with breakthroughs in information technology, and the acceleration of processes of globalization, state deregulation and privatizations. (Davidson, 2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) .
Pioneering studies in Latin America regarding M&As are that of Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Nash, and Tapia (2006) that look to identify the existence of abnormal returns in the value of purchased companies (targets), on the public announcement of offers of acquisition in Latin American countries; Corredor, Pombo and Corredor (2009) that study the influence of corporate government indicators in the probability that M&As are carried out in Colombia; and Pablo (2009) that identifies the determinants of mergers and transnational acquisitions in Latin American countries. We don't know of any study of M&As waves in Latin America.
Two main hypothesis have been proposed to explain the determinants of M&A activity. The neoclassical hypothesis suggests that the waves of M&As are a response to structural changes at industry level such as new regulations, changes in cost structure and technological innovations (industry shocks). Specifically, Gort (1969) , Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Hartford (2005) argue that the shocks and structural changes in industries require the redistribution of assets to more productive uses, for example, in the form of M&As. In the same vein, a positive shock in the demand of an industry increases the cost of opportunity for an inefficient producer, in consequence, the assets will be relocalized in the search for greater productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001) . In this respect Nelson (1959) finds that economic growth and the business cycle are related to the activity of M&As.
Finally, Harford (2005) presents evidence of M&As waves throughout the economy as a response to structural shocks that affect various industries at the same time, conditioned to the existence of sufficient liquidity to finance the deals.
Under the term "Alternative hypothesis" we include three alternative explanations to the neoclassical paradigm and efficient markets for M&A activity, namely: misvaluation, empire building and hubris. First, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) postulate that M&As are a consequence of rational management decisions taking advantage of irrational or erroneous valuations (misvaluations) on the market. In this context, the targets tend to be more undervalued than their acquirers. In this way, the market overvaluations could be linked to M&As waves, as argued by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) . As evidence to support this, the authors find a positive relation between the dispersion on the ratios of the companies in an industry ( p.e. the price-to-book ratio) and M&As waves. Supporting this explanation, Mueller, Gugler, and Weichselbaumer (2011) find that peaks in activity of M&As are limited exclusively to companies listed on the stock exchange, and coincide with peaks of booms in the stock market, which can´t be explained by the neoclassical hypothesis Second, M&As can be motivated by the benefits that management extract of running a larger firm, instead of sound fundamental reasons, in what is called "empire building" (Jensen, 1986; Martynova y and Renneboog, 2008) . In this respect, Mueller (1969) argues that illmonitored managers might embark in mergers and adquisictions for the sake of maximizing the company size, regardless of any value creation or destruction for the shareholders.
Third, Roll (1986) offers a theory in which management is irrational, and assumes incorrectly that its valuations are better than those of the market. In this case, activity of M&As is mainly triggered by personal motives associated with the hubris on the part of the acquiring management.
Hypothesis
The literature summarized above is the basis for the following hypothesis with respect to the activity of M&As in Latin American economies: Martynova and Renneboog (2008) , compile studies regarding waves of M&As in the markets of the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia; in addition, the research of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) document waves of M&As in the United States; and Mueller, Gugler, and Weichselbaumer (2011) for the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. Inasmuch as M&As in Latin America are mostly explained by large scale structural changes and macroeconomic conditions, some of worldwide reach, we should expect M&A activity in the region to happen in waves.
Hypothesis 1: In Latin American economies there is evidence of M&As waves, as in other regions of the world.
Hypothesis 2: The M&A activity in Latin American countries is affected by macroeconomic and industry-specific factors.. Stigler (1950) , Gort (1969) , Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Harford (2005) find evidence of economic factors as an important motivation for M&As, as implied by the neoclassical hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The M&A activity in Latin American countries is affected by distortions in the valuation of the companies in stock markets. In the Alternative hypothesis, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan,(2005) show the dispersion of firm market value with respect to their fundamental value as a determinant of M&A activity at industry-level. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model in which managers take advantage of misvaluations by means of M&As.
Data
The industries strictly regulated and/or with special accounting, specifically financial services, utilities, education and health. Additionally, deals where the percentage of participation looked for by the bidder is less than 5% are discarded.
Financial and market information for individual companies is compiled from the Economática database, which includes most of the companies registered in the stock markets of the countries studied. From this database, we obtained consolidated financial statements in dollars, name of the company and industry classification for the period 1995 to 2010 4 .
The macroeconomic variables and the business environment gradings, were taken from several sources: Bloomberg, World Bank, Political Risk Services Group and the Heritage Foundation. For the information regarding the regulation of the countries considered were consulted The Economist Intelligence Unit, and the regulatory agency in each country.
Applying the described selection criteria, we obtain a sample of 2,490 announcements of M&As, that correspond to 90% of the activity in total Latin America, reported by Thomson One. As detailed in Privatizations are excluded, since, despite sharing some determining factors with the processes of M&As, for being, in most part, an instrument of economic policy (Megginson, Nash, and Van Randerborgh, 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001 ). 4 The difference in the periods taken for the identification of waves and determinants of activity is due to the lack of accounting data before 1995. Table 2 reports the number of announcements of M&As depending on the procedence of the acquirer. In the period of study, 53% of the announcements correspond to national acquirers, 5.2% to acquirers came from the region, and the rest come from outside Latinamerica. As presented in Table 3 , 71.65% of all M&As announcements are between companies that operate in the same industry (focalization) 6 , while the rest correspond to interindustry deals, pursuing diversification or vertical integration. Finally, upon reviewing the method of payment it is found that for the M&As with available deal details, the principal method of payment is cash. Table 3 offers more details about the reported information. We define as focalization the set of M&As between companies with the same first two digits of the SIC code, following Martynova and Renneboog (2006) . 
Identifiying waves of M&As
We begin testing for waves on M&A activity in Latin America following the methodology proposed by Harford (2005) . As in that paper, given the decrease in activity between 2002 and 2003 (Figure 2 ), the sample is divided into two subperiods: 1993 to 2002 and 2003 to 2010. Starting from the M&As universe described above, the deals are grouped by country and economic sector in a quarterly basis. Then, each subperiod is divided into nonoverlapping windows of two years. The methodology calls for identifying the window of two years with the greatest number of M&As, and testing through Simulation by Boostrapping.
If that two-year window presents a statistically significant high number of deals compared with those of remaining two-year windows, a wave of M&As has been identified. 
Econometric model and description of variables
An unbalanced panel data model is used to tests for the determinants of M&A activity against economic environment, business environment and industry variables. We include as explanatory variables of the economic environment the interest rate (IR), the unemployment rate (UN), the GDP and the country risk (CR). The business environment variables are the business freedom index (BUS_FREE), the fiscal freedom index (FISCAL_FREE) and changes in the competition laws (REG Hypothesis (H2), following Stigler (1950) , Gort (1969) , Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , Rossy and Volpin (2004) and Pablo (2009) . Finally, we include the following industry variables to test for some implications of the alternative hypothesis (H3): the return on assets (ROA) the Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) and Intra-industry standard deviation of the MTB. The definition, description and expected sign for each variable, is detailed in Table C of the Appendix. Additionally, to control for endogeneity, all explanatory variables are found lagging behind a period, following Harford (2005) and Kamaly (2007) .
The dependent variable is calculated applying a logarithmic transformation on the number of announcements of M&As by industry-country-year, as follows: Where, t is the year , i represents industry, c indicates country, ‫ݕ‬ ௧ is the measure of M&A activity, ′ ,௧ିଵ is the matrix of explanatory variables, ߙ is the industry-country effect and ߤ ௧ is the error. The model is estimated at industry-country level, at annual frequency, from 1995 to 2010, since most of the explanatory variables are only available beginning from 1995.
Country-industries with too few M&As were discarded using a Pareto analysis. Neither were included industries where accounting information was not available. The industries finally selected were metallic minerals, petroleum and natural gas, food, chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, commercial services and engineering and administration services, corresponding with the most dynamic industries of the economy in the Latin American countries. (Mustajo, 2000; Garcia, 2003) . Along with privatizations, the regulation in those sectors was reformed with the aim of attracting foreign investors and improving the level of competition (Estache and Trujillo, 2004) . For example, barriers were eliminated to the entry of foreign investment in the financial sector, motivating international banks to set up subsidiaries in the region by means of M&As (García and Gómez, 2009 ). (Thomson Reuters, 2010) . Furthermore, the greater part of the concentration of announcements is found in the window 2009-2010, which suggests the possibility that in the region a new wave of M&A activity was forming at the time.
Results

Waves of M&As in Latin American economies
In short, upon analyzing the activity of Latin American M&As in the sample from 1993 to 2010, we found evidence of waves in agreement with H1. They seem related with economics and regulatory changes in the region, such as reported in studies carried out in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia. A formal test of those relations is provided below by the estimation of the panel data model
Determinants of M&As in Latin American economies
We run different specifications of the PCES Prais-Winsten model (1) to estimate the determinants of M&As in Latin America, the results of which are reported in Table 6 . As mentioned above, the model includes macroeconomic and business environment variables, as well as industry specific variables to test both the neoclassical and the alternative hypothesis.
According to the results reported in column 1, the country economic and business environment seems to have an important impact on the activity of M&As. To begin with, a negative and significant coefficient of the interest rate (IR) can be interpreted as greater interest rates implying less M&A activity. This result coincides with Pablo (2009) who argues that lower rates of interest are signs of a better economic environment in the countries, and also with Harford (2005) , who interprets it as a proxy of costs of transaction or funding.
For its part, the rate of unemployment (UN) presents a significant and negative relation with the M&A activity. In studies like those of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Rau and Stouraitis (2009) the rate of unemployment is used as a proxy of economic stability in countries, hence this result suggests that a better economic environment makes more M&A deals possible. On the other hand, the coefficient of GDP presents a highly significant and negative coefficient with the activity of M&As, which have been supported in two ways. On one hand, Gort (1969) , Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) and Neto, Brandão and Cerqueira (2010) , indicate that a growth in demand can encourage the establishing of new businesses instead of carrying out M&As in a country. On the other hand, a weak economy might be favorable to the M&A deals searching consolidation inside an industry, looking for reducing costs and a more efficient use of resources (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner, 2003) .
In turn, the estimated coefficient of the the variable risk country (CR) resulted positive and highly significant. Given that a greater score signifies a lesser risk, the result agree with the notion that a riskier country will have less activity in M&As, similar to that obtained in other studies that have used measures of political risk like Ragozzino (2009) or Bris, Cabolis and Janowski (2007) .
To estimate the effect of the business environment in the activity of M&As, proxies the business freedom index (BUS_FREE) and the fiscal freedom index (FISCAL_FREE) are included in the model. With respect to BUS_FREE, the negative and highly significant coefficient suggests that a greater facility for creating and operating new businesses lessens the necessity for M&As, promoting greenfield investments. Regarding the second variable, FISCAL_FREE, the positive and highly significant coefficient indicates that low tax rates increase the activity of M&As, since high tax rates are disincentive for investments, especially FDI. A similar result was reported by Di Giovanni (2005) and Agostini and Jalile (2009) . As an additional measure of the business environment the variable of regulatory changes in competition laws in the countries studied (REG). This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the year of change in the law, 0 otherwise. In this respect, the positive and marginally significant coefficient reported, suggest that a regulatory improvement in competition increases the M&A activity. Stigler (1950) has already found similar results and in a more recent study and Bris, Cabolis and Janowski (2007) In column 2 specific variables for industry are included. The first of these, return on assets (ROA), shows a positive and significant impact on the activity of M&As. This result suggest that upon considering an integration between companies, the operative efficiencies that can be incorporated after the integration are an important incentive, in agreement with the neoclassical hypothesis (H2). Harford (2005) obtained a similar result in his research for the United States, whereas Pablo (2009) reports a result statistically not significant for Latin America.
On the other hand, upon analyzing the Market to Book ratio (MTB) and the deviation intraindustry of the same variable (σ_MTB), a significant relation with the activity of M&As is not found, as reported in column 3. These two variables have been used in the literature to test for the misvaluation explanation (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005 y Harford, 2005) . Thus the results don't support H3 in Latin American economies. Moreover, although the interest rate (IR) and the fiscal-free index (FISCAL_FREE) stop being significant in column (3), the rest of the economic and business environment variables maintain qualitatively the same effect on M&A activity. Finally, in column 4, the coefficients of the base model excluding the non-significant variables are reported. Overall, this result suggests that the economic and business environment of the country, as well as the operative efficiency of the respective industry are important drivers of M&A activity in Latin America, whereas misvaluation effects are not.
Robustness tests
Next, two robustness tests are run. First, given that the present study finds a negative effect of the GDP on M&A activity, in contradiction with some previous studies (Di Giovanni, 2005 and Pablo, 2009 ), this effect is further explored employing interactive variables between GDP and country dummies. On the other hand, the model is run in two subsets: national and transnational M&As, depending on whether the acquirer and target share the same country. In Table 7 the findings are summarised.
In column 1 the results of the base model, already shown in column 3 of Table 6 , are included. As can be observed in column 2, upon incorporating the interactive variables, the effect of the GDP variables per country keep the negative sign, however, this result is only significant for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, whereas the coefficients of the other variables result are still consistent with previous reports.
Column 3 corresponds to the results of the model for the subset of national M&As. The results indicate that only the interest rate, the business freedom index and the risk country are significant when it comes down to explaining variation in the national M&As. On the other hand, the results reported in column 4 belong to the base model run for the transnational M&As showing that all economic environment variables of the original model, except the interest rate, motivate the activity of this subset of M&As.
As shown by the results in Table 7 , the coefficients of macro and industry determinants of the activity of M&As model turn out robust to the alternative specifications, supporting the neoclassical hypothesis (H2). On one hand, the negative effect of GDP over the activity of M&As is confirmed, for the sample countries, statistically significant for the half of them. On the other hand, the effect of most of the variables on the base model is maintained when the dependent variable is restricted either to national or transnational M&As The most common of them is the Poisson regression. However, the negative binomial regression is a more flexible alternative that doesn't assume that the mean and the variance are the same (Cámeron and Trivedi, 2005) . In fact, the Poisson model is found inadequate by the overdispersion-in-variance test. Instead, the negative binomial regression model generalizes the Poisson model by introducing an unobserved individual effect to the variance of the model: Finally, no evidence was found to favor the alternative hypothesis as a complementary explanation in the activity of M&As in the studied countries. Specifically, upon examining the level of activity in relation to distortions in the valuation of companies in the stock markets, there were no significant statistical results. The absence of a misvaluation effect on the M&A activity appears consistent with the typical high ownership concentration detected in Latin America's firms. This, along with other negative corporate governance features in the region, might be impeding the use of hostile takeovers as a way to impose market discipline in mismanaged companies (La Porta et al, 1999) . Reinforcing this point, we note that none of the deals compiled in Thomson One for the six Latin American markets corresponds to a hostile takeover, and most of the deals were paid by cash.
Left for future studies are the analysis of the behavior of M&As in Latin America conditioned on the strategy of integration (horizontal, vertical or diversification) , and the study of agency problems and corporative government associated to M&A deals, as well as the short and long term behavior of the performance of companies after M&As. Is a quantitative measure that represents the level of procedures required to start, operate, and close a business. The freedom score for each country and year is a number between 0 and 100, where 100 equals the free enterprise environment The Heritage Foundation (-)
APPENDIX
Is a measure of the tax burden regulated by the government in the countries. The freedom score for each country per year is a number between 0 and 100, with 100 equaling the environment of lower tax burden. 
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